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A Continuation Values and Expected Utilities
Let V̄i denote i’s continuation value after a history in which the Periphery was won control of the
territory. These values are independent of a strategy profileσ and take the form V̄C = 0 and V̄P =
πPP
1−δ .
Let Vσi (g) denotes i’s continuation value from beginning the game with grievance g when the
Periphery has not won control of its territory and actors subsequently playing according to profile
σ. In a similar vein, UσC (r; g) and U
σ
P (m; g) denote the Center and Periphery’s dynamic payoffs from
choosing r ∈ {∅, 0, 1} and m ∈ {0, 1} given grievance g when actors subsequently play according to
profile σ. For the Center, UσC (r; g) takes the following form:
UσC (r; g) =

0 if = ∅
πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1) if r = 1




C (max{g − 1, 0})
)
if r = 0.
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For the Periphery, UσP (m; g) denotes the its dynamic payoff conditional on having reached its deci-
sion node, i.e., the Center chooses r = 0, in state g. Thus, UσP (m; g) takes the form
UσP (m; g) =




P (max{g − 1, 0})
)
if m = 1
πCP + δV
σ
P (max{g − 1, 0}) if m = 0.
(5)
With this notation in hand, the next definition states the equilibrium conditions.
Definition 1 Strategy profile σ is an equilibrium if the following hold:




σP(g) > 0 =⇒ UσP (1; g) ≥ U
σ
P (0; g), and
σP(g) < 1 =⇒ UσP (0; g) ≥ U
σ
P (1; g)
for all grievance g and polices r, r′ ∈ {∅, 0, 1}.
Because the game is a dynamic game with a countable state space and a finite number of
actions, an equilibrium from Definition 1 exists in mixed strategies. Notice that for some grievance




σ(r; g)UσC (r; g).
Thus, if σ is an equilibrium and σ(r; g) > 0 for some grievance g and action r ∈ {∅, 0, 1}, then
VσC (g) = U
σ
C (r; g) or else C has a deviation by playing some r
′ ∈ {∅, 0, 1}.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 If grievances are small, then the Periphery never mobilizes, the Center neither re-
presses nor grants independence, and grievances dissipate on the equilibrium path. That is, g ≤ g−
implies σP(g) = 0 and σC(0; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. The proof that g ≤ g− implies the Periphery does not mobilize with positive probability
is covered in the main text. We prove that g ≤ g− implies the Center does not repress or grant
independence with positive probability. To see this, suppose σC(r; g) > 0 for some g ≤ g−, r , 0,
and equilibrium σ. There are two cases.
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Case 1: r = 1, repression. Then, C’s expected utility is
UσC (1; g) = πC − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1)










1−δ is C’s continuation value if it takes action r = 0 in all future periods because grievances
will never increase and P will never mobilize with positive probability along the subsequent path of
play. Hence, taking action r = 0 in all future periods is a profitable deviation, a contradiction.
Case 2: r = ∅, independence. Then, C’s expected utility is




As in Case 1, this inequality implies taking action r = 0 in all future periods is a profitable deviation,
a contradiction. 
C Properties of ṼC
We first state and prove three Lemmas concerning properties of ṼC.
Lemma 1 1. ṼC(g) >
−F(g)ψ+(1−F(g))πCC
1−(1−F(g))δ for all g such that F(g) > 0.
2. ṼC(g − 1) > ṼC(g) for all g > g−.
3. If Assumption 1 holds, then limg→∞ ṼC(g) =
−pψ+(1−p)πCC
1−(1−p)δ .
Proof. To show (1), consider some g such that F(g) > 0 and F(g′) = 0 for all g′ < g. Such a g exists
because F(0) = 0 and limg→∞ F(g) = p > 0. In addition, F(g) < 1 because there exists at least one
g such that F(g) ∈ (0, 1) by assumption. Then we have






= (1 − (1 − F(g))δ)
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ




−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
,
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where the strict inequality follows because F(g) ∈ (0, 1)
For induction, consider some g such that F(g) > 0 and F(g − 1) > 0, which implies g − 1 > 0.
Suppose the inequality holds for all g′ < g such that F(g′) > 0. Then we have
ṼC(g) = −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))(πCC + δṼC(g − 1))
> −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))
(
πCC + δ
−F(g − 1)ψ + (1 − F(g − 1))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g − 1))δ
)
≥ −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))
(
πCC + δ
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
)
=
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
,
where the third line follows because the fraction −F(g)ψ+(1−F(g))π
C
C
1−(1−F(g))δ is decreasing in F(g).
To show (2), note that it must hold when g = g− + 1, because ψ > 0 and F(g) > 0 as g > g−.
Now consider some g > g− + 1. For induction, suppose ṼC(g′ − 1) > ṼC(g′) for all g′ such that
g− < g′ < g. Then
ṼC(g) = −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))(πCC + δṼC(g − 1))
≤ −F(g − 1)ψ + (1 − F(g − 1))(πCC + δṼC(g − 1))
< −F(g − 1)ψ + (1 − F(g − 1))(πCC + δṼC(g − 2))
= ṼC(g − 1),
where the second line follows because
ṼC(g) >
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
≥ −ψ
and F(g) is increasing in g.


























(1 − F(gn))(πCC + δṼC(gn − 1))
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The next Lemma demonstrates that C’s gambling for unity utility, ṼC is a lower bound on its
equilibrium expected utility, VσC .
Lemma 2 For all grievances g, VσC (g) ≥ ṼC(g) in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. To see this, suppose not. That is, suppose there exist grievance g and equilibrium σ such that
VσC (g) < ṼC(g). Then by the construction of ṼC and Proposition 1, g > g
−, or else VσC (g) =
πCC
1−δ = ṼC.
Next consider a deviation for C, labeled σ′C, such that σ
′
C(0; g
′) = 1 for all g′ ≤ g. I now
demonstrate that Vσ
′
C (g) ≥ ṼC(g), where σ
′ = (σ′C, σP), which implies σ
′
C is a profitable deviation
because ṼC(g) > VσC (g) by supposition.
The proof is by induction. The inequality, Vσ
′
C (g
′) ≥ ṼC(g′), holds when g′ ≤ g− by the




























C (g) ≥ ṼC(g) as required. 
The final Lemma demonstrates that the cutpoint g+ exists if and only if Assumptions 1 and 2
hold.
Lemma 3 The cutpoint g+ solving Equation (3) exists if and only if the Periphery values indepen-
dence (Assumption 1) and secession is costly (Assumption 2).
Proof. For necessity, suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then Lemma 1 and Assumption 1 imply




−pψ + (1 − p)πCC
1 − (1 − p)δ
.
5
Supplemental Material (not copyedited or formatted) for: Michael Gibilisco. 2021. "Decentralization, Repression, 
and Gambling for Unity." The Journal of Politics 83(4). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/711626.
Because ṼC(g) =
πCC
1−δ > 0 for all g ≤ g
− and ṼC(g) is strictly decreasing in g when g > g−, we require
−pψ + (1 − p)πCC








We now demonstrate that the inequality in Equation (6) holds when πCC > κC, the proof when
πCC < κC is identical. Suppose π
C
C − κC > 0. Then Equation (6) reduces to
−pψ + (1 − p)πCC





which is equivalent to
ψ >
(1 − δ)κC − p(πCC − δκC)
p(1 − δ)
.










(1 − δ)κC − p(πCC − δκC)
p(1 − δ)
.
Thus, the inequality in Equation (6) holds, and therefore g+ exists.




1−δ for all grievances







for all grievances g. Now suppose Assumption 1 holds but
not Assumption 2. Then Lemma 1 implies that, for all g
ṼC(g) ≥
−pψ + (1 − p)πCC









In this section, we state and prove two technical results that are essential to characterize equi-
libria in the remainder of the paper.
Lemma 4 If σC(1; g) > 0 and σC(0; g + 1) = 1 for some grievance g, then σP(g + 1) < 1 in every
equilibrium σ.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists a g such that σC(1; g) > 1, σC(0; g + 1) = 1 and σP(g + 1) = 1
in equilibrium σ. We can write VσC (g + 1) as
















πCC − κC + δV
σ




VσC (g + 1) =
(1 − F(g + 1))(π(1 + δ) − δκC) − F(g + 1)ψ
1 − (1 − F(g + 1))δ2
.
By Lemma 2, VσC (g + 1) ≥ ṼC(g + 1). By Lemma 1.1,
ṼC(g) >
(1 − F(g + 1))πCC − F(g + 1)ψ
1 − (1 − F(g + 1)δ)
.
Stringing these two inequalities together,
VσC (g + 1) >
(1 − F(g + 1))πCC − F(g + 1)ψ
1 − (1 − F(g + 1)δ)
.
Substituting the closed form solution for VσC (g + 1) into the inequality above and solving for κC
reveals that
κC <
F(g + 1)(πCC + ψ(1 − δ))
1 − (1 − F(g + 1))δ
.
To derive a contradiction, consider a deviation in which C plays r = 1 with probability 1 in all
future periods beginning at grievance g + 1. This is a profitable deviation if and only if




F(g + 1)(πCC + ψ(1 − δ))




1−(1−F(g+1))δ as shown above. Hence, C can profitably deviate by repressing in all
future periods. 
Lemma 5 Consider some g > g− and equilibrium σ. If (a) σC(0; g− 1) = 1 or σC(0; g) = 1 and (b)
σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ < g, then σP(g) = 1.
Proof. Suppose not. That is, consider some equilibrium σ and grievance g > g− such that
(a) σC(0; g − 1) = 1 or σC(0; g) = 1,
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(b) σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ < g, and
(c) σP(g) < 1.
Because σ is an equilibrium, we require UσP (0; g) ≥ U
σ




V̄P − πCP − δV
σ
P (g − 1)
]
.
Because σC(0; g− 1) = 1 or σC(0; g) = 1, the path of play will never reach a grievance larger than g.
Because σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ ≤ g, the Center will never grant independence along the subsequent
path of play. Recall that when the C represses, P stage payoff is πCP , which is its payoff if it chooses
not to mobilize, and even if C does repress with positive probability at some g′ < g, the subsequent
path of play will still never reach a grievance larger than g. Then g > g− implies VσP (g−1) is bounded
above by
F(g)V̄P + (1 − F(g))πCP − κP
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
,
which is P’s payoff if its grievance never depreciates along the path of play, C never represses, and
P always mobilizes. Combining these two inequalities, we require
κP ≥ F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δV
σ




V̄P − πCP − δ
F(g)V̄P + (1 − F(g))πCP − κP
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
]
.







that is, g ≤ g−. But this contradicts the assumption g > g−. 
E Proof of Proposition 2
This section characterizes equilibrium behavior at moderate grievances.
We now prove that g < g+ implies σC(0; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ, that is, the Center
neither represses nor grants independence with moderate grievances. The result requires preliminary





for all g, and
we can set g+ = ∞ in the subsequent results.
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Lemma 6 If g < g+, then σC(∅; g) = 0 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. If not, then VσC (g) = U
σ
C (∅; g) = 0. If g < g
+, this contradicts Lemma 2 because ṼC(g) > 0 =
VσC (g). 
Lemma 7 For all g, σ(r; g) > 0 imply σ(∅; g + 1) = 0 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. First, if κC < πCC, then C cannot grant independence with positive probability in any equi-




1−δ > 0. Thus, consider the case where π
C
C − κC < 0. Suppose σC(r; g) > 0 for some g
and σC(∅; g + 1) > 0. Then
VσC (g) = U
σ
C (r; g)
= πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1)
= πCC − κC + δU
σ
C (∅; g)
= πCC − κC < 0,
but this means C can profitably deviate at g by granting independence, i.e., σ is not an equilibrium.

Lemma 8 Fix an equilibrium σ. Then there does not exist a g < g+ such that σC(1; g′) > 0 for all
g′ ≥ g.
Proof. Suppose not and consider such a g < g+ where σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ ≥ g in equilibrium σ.
Then
VσC (g) = U
σ
C (1; g) = π
C
C − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1).
Because VC(g′) = UσC (r; g
′) for all g′ such that σC(r; g′) > 0, similar substitutions imply VσC (g) =
πCC−κC






by Equation(3). However, ṼC(g) > VσC (g) contradicts Lemma 2. 
With these lemmas in hand, we now state the main result of the section.
Proposition 2 If grievances are moderate, then the Periphery always mobilizes, the Center neither
represses nor grants independence, and grievances dissipate on the equilibrium path. That is, g ∈
(g−, g+) implies σP(g) = 1 and σC(0; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
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Proof. We first prove prove that σC(0; g) = 1 when g ∈ (g−, g+) and σ is an equilibrium. Suppose
not. By Lemma 6, σC(1; g) > 0. Furthermore, C represses with positive probability for at most some
finite k periods by Lemma 8. That is, there exists a ḡ such that σC(1; g′) > 0 for g′ = g, ..., ḡ and
σC(1; ḡ + 1) = 0. By Lemma 7, this implies σC(0; ḡ + 1) = 1. In addition, Proposition 1 and Lemma
7 imply σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ < ḡ. Thus, Lemma 5 and σC(1; ḡ + 1) = 0 imply P mobilizes at ḡ + 1
with probability 1. However, σC(1; ḡ) > 0, σC(0; ḡ + 1) = 1, and σP(ḡ + 1) = 1 contradict Lemma
4. To pin down P’s strategy at g ∈ (g−, g+), note that σC(0; g′) = 1 for all g′ < g+. Then Lemma 5
implies σP(g) = 1. 
F Proof of Proposition 3
We now characterize equilibrium behavior at large grievances (g ≥ g+). We consider the











, where the inequality from Equation (3) holds strictly. If this held with equality, the
Center would be indifferent leading to trivial indeterminacy. We consider high- and low-capacity
regimes separately because the proof techniques vary dramatically between the two cases.
F.1 High repression capacity: κC < πCC
Lemma 9 In high-capacity regimes, σC(∅; g) = 0 for every grievance g and in every equilibrium
σ.
The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 10 In high-capacity regimes, σC(1; g+) = 1 and σC(1; g) > 0 for all g > g+ in every
equilibrium σ.
Proof. The proof is by induction. First, we demonstrate that σC(1; g+) = 1. To see this, suppose
σC(1; g+) < 1. Then Lemma 9 implies σC(0; g+) > 0, in which case we have
UσC (0; g




This means C can profitably deviate at grievance g+ by repressing for an infinite number of periods,
a contradiction.
For induction, consider some g > g+ and assume σC(1; g − 1) > 0. To derive a contradiction,
assume σC(1; g) = 0. By Lemma 9, σC(0; g) = 1. Likewise, Lemma 9 guarantees C does not grant
10
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independence in any equilibrium, so Lemma 5 implies P mobilizes at g with probability 1. But then
this contradicts Lemma 4. 
Lemma 11 In high-capacity regimes, g ≥ g+ implies VσC (g) =
πCC−κC
1−δ in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. If g ≥ g+, then Lemma 10 implies σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ ≥ g. The remainder of the proof
follows from an identical argument as the one in Lemma 8. 
Lemma 12 In high-capacity regimes, g > g+ and σC(0; g) > 0 imply σP(g) < 1 in every equilibrium
σ.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists g > g+ such that σC(0; g) > 0 and σP(g) = 1. Because g > g+,




UσC (0; g) = U
σ




C (g − 1)) = π − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1)










F(g)(πCC + (1 − δ)ψ)
1(1 − F(g))δ
,
where we use Lemma 11 and g − 1 ≥ g+ to substitute for values VσC (g − 1) and V
σ
C (g + 1).
Because σ is an equilibrium, we require UσC (1; g) = V
σ
C (g) ≥ ṼC(g), by Lemma 2. Then
Lemma 1.1 implies
UσC (1; g) >
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC





−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
⇐⇒ κC <
F(g)(πCC + (1 − δ)ψ)
1(1 − F(g))δ
,
which establishes the desired contradiction. 
Lemma 13 In high-capacity regimes, there exists cutpoint ḡ ∈ R such that if g > ḡ, then σP(g) = 1
and σC(1; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. The proof is constructive. Define ḡ ∈ N0 to be a number that satisfies
g ≥ ḡ =⇒ κP < F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δ
pV̄P + (1 − p)πCP − κP
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Such a ḡ exists because F(g)
[










V̄P − πCP − δ
pV̄P + (1 − p)πCP















We first show that σP(g) = 1 for g ≥ ḡ. Suppose not; then there exists g ≥ ḡ such that
σP(g) < 1. To rule out profitable deviations, we require UσP (0; g) ≥ U
σ
P (1; g), which is equivalent to
κP ≥ F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δV
σ
P (g − 1)
]
.
Because the Center never grants independence in strong regimes, VσP (g − 1) is bounded above by
pV̄P+(1−p)πCP−κP
1−(1−p)δ , which is the Periphery’s dynamic payoff if it mobilizes in every period at maximum
capacity, p. Combining these two inequalities gives us
κP ≥ F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δV
σ




V̄P − πCP − δ
pV̄P + (1 − p)πCP − κP
1 − (1 − p)δ
]
,
but this implies g < ḡ, which is contradiction. Thus, σP(g) = 1. Then Lemma 10 and the contrapos-
itive of Lemma 12 imply σC(1; g) = 1, as required. 
Lemma 14 In high-capacity regimes, if g ≥ g+, then σP(g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. Suppose there exists g ≥ g+ such that σP(g) < 1. Lemma 13 implies that there exists
grievance g† ≥ g such that σP(g†) < 1 and σP(g′) = σC(1; g′) = 1 for all g′ > g†. To rule out
profitable deviations, we require UσP (0; g










Because P will never be able to mobilize at a larger grievance than g† along the path of play and C
never grants independence, VσC (g
† − 1) is bounded above by
F(g†)V̄P + (1 − F(g†))πCP − κP
1 − (1 − F(g†)δ)
.
12
Supplemental Material (not copyedited or formatted) for: Michael Gibilisco. 2021. "Decentralization, Repression, 











V̄P − πCP − δ
F(g†)V̄P + (1 − F(g†))πCP − κP








which implies g† ≤ g− ≤ g+, a contradiction. 
We now prove Proposition 3.1, which characterizes equilibria in regimes with large grievances
when πCC > κC.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. If g ≥ g+, then Lemma 14 implies σP(g) = 1. Because g > g+ implies
σP(g) = 1. Lemma 10 and the contrapositive of Lemma 12 imply σC(1; g) = 1, as required. 
F.2 Low repression capacity: κC > πCC
Lemma 15 Fix an equilibrium σ. In low-capacity regimes, the there does not exist grievance g such
that σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ ≥ g.
Proof. The result follows from the inequality πCC − κC < 0 and the argument proving Lemma 8. 
Lemma 16 In low-capacity regimes, σP(g+) = 1, σC(0; g+) = 0, and σC(∅; g+) > 0 in ever equilib-
rium σ.
Proof. First, P mobilizes at g+ by Lemma 5 and Proposition 2.
Second, σC(0; g+) = 0. If not, then with positive probability the Center chooses to enter
the path of play into moderate grievance levels. That is, VσC (g
+) = UσC (0; g
+) = ṼC(g+). But then
VσC (g
+) < 0 because the regime has low capacity, so C can profitably deviate by granting indepen-
dence at g+.
Third, σC(1; g+) < 1. To see this, suppose not, i.e., suppose σC(1; g+) = 1. By Lemma 15,
there exists g† ≥ g+ such that σC(1; g† + 1) = 0 and σC(1; g†) > 0 for all g′ = g+, ..., g†. Then
by Lemma 7, σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ = g+, .., g† + 1. By Proposition 2, σC(0; g′) = 1 for all
g′ < g+. Then Lemma 5 implies σP(g† + 1) = 1. However, σC(1; g†) > 0, σC(0; g† + 1) = 1, and
σP(g† + 1) = 1 contradict Lemma 4. Thus, σC(1; g+) < 1, which implies σC(∅; g+) > 0 by the
previous paragraph. 
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Before proving the last technical lemma of this section, consider the following definitions. The
set G ⊆ N0 is an absorbing set with respect to profile σ if once the path of play enters grievance level
g such that g ∈ G, it never transitions to a grievance g′ such that g′ < G with positive probability.
The set G is an irreducible absorbing set with respect to σ if G is an absorbing set with respect to σ
and there does not exist a proper subset G′ ( G such that G′ is an absorbing set with respect to σ.
Lemma 17 Consider an equilibrium σ and some grievance g ≥ g+. Then the following hold:
1. beginning at grievance g, the path of play enters an irreducible absorbing set G with respect
to σ,
2. maxG exists,
3. g+ ≤ minG, and
4. there exists g′ ∈ G such that σC(∅; g) > 0.
Proof. To prove (1), consider g ≥ g+ and two cases. If σC(1; g) = 0, then the path of play enters the
set {g+, ..., g}, which is an absorbing set because σC(0; g+) = 0 by Lemma 16. So the set {g+, ..., g}
has a irreducible absorbing set, G. If σC(1; g) > 0, then Lemma 15 implies there exists g† ≥ g such
that σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ = g, ..., g† and σC(1; g† + 1) = 0 from Lemma 7. Then the path of play
enters the set {g+, ..., g† + 1}, which is an absorbing set as well.
The proof of (2) and (3) follow immediately from the existence of G and Lemmas 15 and 16,
respectively.
To prove (4), suppose not. Suppose σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ ∈ G. I first claim that it must be
the case that #G > 1. Suppose the contrary. Then G = {g′}, and C cannot be repressing with positive
probability at g, or else G is not absorbing. Also, if G = {g′} and σC(0; g′) > 0, then F(g) = 1 and
σP(g) = 1 or else the path of play would transition to g − 1 with positive probability. In this case,
UC(0; g′) = −ψ < 0, but this means C has a profitable deviation by granting independence at g′.
Thus, #G > 2 and as such maxG − 1 ∈ G.
Second, becauseG is irreducible, σC(1; maxG−1) > 0, or elseG\{maxG}would be absorbing
as well. Furthermore, σC(1; maxG) = 0 or else the path of play would transition with positive
probability to maxG + 1. Because σC(1; maxG − 1) > 0 and σC(1; maxG) = 0, Lemma 7 implies
σC(0; maxG) = 1 Because the path of play never leaves G nor transitions to grievance g′ > maxG
and C never grants independence along the path of play starting from maxG, then σP(maxG) = 1,
which follows from an identical argument as the one in Lemma 5. However, this contradicts Lemma
4. 
The proof of Proposition 3.2 follows from Lemma 17.
14
Supplemental Material (not copyedited or formatted) for: Michael Gibilisco. 2021. "Decentralization, Repression, 
and Gambling for Unity." The Journal of Politics 83(4). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/711626.
G Proof of Proposition 4
First, the result in Proposition 4.1 follows immediately form Lemma 15. Second, the result
in Proposition 4.2 is proved below in Lemma 18. Third, I construct an equilibrium that supports
cycles of repression and mobilization, as described in Proposition 4.3, in Example 1. As part of this
construction, I need a new result in Lemma 19.
Lemma 18 If κC > (1+δ)πCC, then the Center never represses in any equilibrium σ, i.e., σC(1; g) = 0
for every grievances g and every equilibrium σ.
Proof. To derive a contradiction, suppose the contrary. That is, suppose κC > (1+δ)πCC and the Center
represses in equilibrium σ. Thus, the regime is has low capacity, and there exist some g such that
σC(1; g) > 0. By Lemma 15, there exists g† ≥ g such that σC(1; g† + 1) = 0 and σC(1; g′) > 0 for all
g′ = g, ..., g†. Then by Lemma 7, σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ = g + 1, .., g† + 1. Hence, σC(0; g† + 1) = 1.
We can compute C’s continuation value at g† as
VσC (g
†) = σC(1; g†)UσC (1; g
†) + σC(0; g†)UσC (0; g
†) = UσC (1; g
†)



























πCC(1 + (1 − F(g
† + 1)σP(g† + 1))δ) − κC − F(g† + 1)σP(g† + 1)δψ
1 − (1 − σP(g† + 1)F(g† + 1))δ2
,
which is decreasing in σP(g† + 1). Because σP(g† + 1) ≥ 0, then
VσC (g
†) ≤
πCC(1 + δ) − κC
1 − δ2
Thus, κC > (1 + δ)πCC implies V
σ
C (g
†) < 0. But this implies C can profitably deviate at g† by granting
independence and guaranteeing itself a payoff of zero. 
Lemma 19 In low-capacity regimes, if F(g)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP and g ≥ g
+, then σP(g′) = 1 and
σC(1; g′) = 0 for all g′ ≥ g in every equilibrium σ.
15
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Proof. By Equation (1), P mobilizes at g′ if
κC < F(g′)
[






An upper bound on VσP (g
′ − 1) is π
P
P
1−δ , which is the discounted sum of P’s largest per-period payoff.
Combining these two inequalities implies P mobilizes when F(g′)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP, which holds
because F(g)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP, and F is increasing.
Second, I claim that σC(1; g′) = 0 for all g′ ≥ g. Suppose not. Then there exists a g† such that
σC(1; g†) > 0 and σC(0; g†+ 1) = 1 by Lemmas 7 and 15. The previous paragraph demonstrates that
P mobilizes with probability 1 with grievance g† + 1. But this contradicts Lemma 4. 
Example 1 In this example, I assume πCC = π
P
P = 1, and π
C
P = 0. In addition, κC = 1.2 and κP = .25.








175 if g ≥ 1 and g ≤ 8
1 otherwise.
Thus, g− = 0, and g+ = 7, because ṼC(6) ≈ .33 and ṼC(7) ≈ −.15. By Proposition 2, the Periphery
mobilizes with probability one for all g ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} and the Center neither represses nor grants
independence for all g ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 6}. Note that F(9)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP, so Lemma 19 implies the
Periphery mobilizes for all grievances g ≥ 9 and the Center does not repress at grievance g ≥ 9.
We specify remaining behavior as follows.
1. At grievance g = 7, the Periphery mobilizes with probability 1 and the Center mixes between
repression and granting independence, σC(1; 7) + σC(∅; 7) = 1
2. At grievance g = 8, the Center neither represses nor grants independence, i.e., σC(0; 8) = 1
and the Periphery mobilizes with probability σP(8).
We first characterize mixing probabilities, σC(1; 7), σC(∅; 7), and σP(8), such that the following
hold:
σC(1; 7) + σC(∅; 7) = 1
UσC (1; 7) = U
σ
C (∅; 7)
UσP (1; 8) = U
σ
P (0; 8).
The first equation says the Center mixes between repression and granting independence at g = 7 =
g+. The second and third equations are C and P’s indifference conditions, respectively. Because
16
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UσC (∅; 7) = 0, C’s indifference equations takes the form:
πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (8) = 0, (7)
where
VσC (8) = σP(8)
[













In equilibrium, VσC (7) = U
σ
C (∅; 7) = 0. Thus, we have
VσC (8) = σP(8)
[
−F(8)ψ + (1 − F(8))πCC
]
+ (1 − σP(8))πCC.
Substituting the above equality into Equation (7), C’s indifference condition takes the form:




−F(8)ψ + (1 − F(8))πCC
]
+ (1 − σP(8))πCC
)
= 0. (8)
Next, consider P’s indifference equation, UσP (1; 8) = U
σ











































Here the second equality follows because σC(0; 8) = 1. Solving Equations (8) and (9) with the
constraint σC(∅; 7) + σC(1; 7) = 1 reveals that
σP(8) =





κP − F(8)(πPP − π
C
P)




Finally, we check profitable deviations. First, P’s indifference condition precludes profitable
deviations at g = 8. Second, C does not have a profitable deviation at g = 7 due to its indifference
17
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equation and because UσC (0; 7) = ṼC(7) < 0. Also, C has no profitable deviation at g = 8, because
VC(8) > 0. To see this, note that UσC (1; 7) = π
C
C − κC + δV
σ
C (8) = 0 by Equation (7), and π
C
C − κC < 0.
If C deviates by granting independence at g = 8, then its payoff is zero. Likewise, if C deviates
by repressing, its payoff is πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (9), which reduces to π
C
C − κC < 0 because C is granting
independence when g = 9. Lemma 19 implies that C cannot profitably deviate by using repression, at
grievances g ≥ 9. Thus, we only need to verify that C cannot profitably deviate by choosing to refrain
from repression or granting independence, at grievances g ≥ 9. Because the Periphery mobilizes at
g ≥ 9 and F(g) = 1, mobilization surely succeeds, implying UσC (0; g) = −ψ for all g ≥ 9 which is
strictly less than C’s utility from following its equilibrium strategy of granting independence.
H Exogenous Decentralization
In this section, I continue to analyze the numerical example in Figure 4 and prove Proposition
5.
From, the example in Figure 4, I compute the probability that the country breaks apart due to
secessionist mobilization —labeled probability of secession hereafter—as a function of decentral-
ization. For a fixed d, three potential paths of play emerge at initial grievance g1 in equilibrium. First,




g′:g†[d]<g′≤g1 (1 − F(g′)) otherwise.
Second, if g1 ≥ g+[d] and the regime has high capacity (π − d > κC), then the Center represses in
all future periods, and the probability of secession is zero. Third, if g1 ≥ g+[d] and the regime has
low capacity (π − d < κC), the probability of secession is undefined. Although the Periphery will
eventually gain control of its territory (Proposition 3.2), this may arise either from secessionist mo-
bilization or Center-granted independence. This third case does not arise in the numerical example.
As seen in Figure 4, if g1 ≥ g+[d] for some d, then the regime has high capacity.
Figure 6 graphs the probability of secession decentralization varies. When d is small, g1 >
g+[d] so the high-capacity regime represses and the probability of secession is zero. When d is
large, g1 < g−, so grievances are small and a lasting peace emerges. When d is moderate, then
the Center gambles for unity and secession occurs with positive probability. When ψ is large (left
panel), all decentralization levels below d = 44 result in long-term repression and a zero probability
of secession. When ψ is small (right panel), all decentralization levels below d = 38 result in
long-term repression and a zero probability of secession.
18
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Figure 6: Decentralization and comparative statics
Large     Small     




















Notes: The panels graph the probability of secession (vertical axis) for a fixed decentrlaization level (horizontal axis)
with a large cost of secession ψ = 3π2 (left) and a small cost ψ =
π
2 (right). The remaining parameters take on the
following valules: π = 100, κC = 50, κP = 50, δ = 0.95, and and F(g) = 1 −
(
0.01g + 0.001g2 − 1
)−1
.
Proposition 5 Assume the regime has a high capacity for repression (κC < π) and initial grievances
are large (g1 ≥ g+[0]). There exist cutpoints d and d such that 0 ≤ d < d < 1 and secession occurs
with positive probability on the equilibrium path only if decentralization is moderate, i.e., d < d < d.
Proof. Set d = 0. The regime has high repression capacity by assumption, and g1 ≥ g+[d] implies
that C represses with probability one in all future periods when the game begins at grievance g1. As
such the probability of secession is zero.
In addition, we can set d̄ as follows
d̄ = d̂(g1) + ε
where d̂ is defined in Equation (4) above and ε ∈ R is such that 0 < ε < max{ (1−δ)κPF(g1) , 1}. Note that
the fraction (1−δ)κPF(g1) is well defined because F(g
1) , 0. If F(g1) = 0 then g1 ≤ g−[0] < g+[0], a
contradiction.




because this inequality implies that g1 is small at decen-
tralization level d̄ and g− is strictly increasing in d. As such, g1 is small at decentralization levels
d > d̄. In addition, when g1 ≤ g− no mobilization occurs along the path of play by Proposition 1.
19
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When πCP = d and π
P





∣∣∣∣∣ κP > F(g)π − d1 − δ
}
.




, as required. 
I Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove Proposition 6.1 and then present two numerical examples that establish Propo-
sitions 6.2 and 6.3.
Proof of 6.1. Consider equilibrium (d∗, σ). We first prove that d∗ ≤ min{d̂(g1), κC}. First, d∗ ≤ κC.
To see this, note that VσC (g; d
∗) ≤ π−d
∗
1−δ . Thus, if C chooses d
∗ > κC, then VσC (g; d
∗) < π−κC1−δ , which
means C can profitably deviate by choosing d∗ = 0 and repressing in all future periods.
Second, d∗ ≤ d̂(g1). When C chooses d∗ > d̂(g1), then g1 ≤ g−[d∗], which implies that
VσC (g
1; d∗) = π−d
∗
1−δ , which is strictly decreasing in d
∗. So C has a profitable deviation by choosing
decentralization d = d∗ − ε for ε > 0 but close to zero. This establishes the desired result.
Finally, we prove that if κC < max
{
π
2 , π − d̂(g
1)
}
and d∗ > 0, then g1 < g+[d∗], i.e., C never
represses nor grants independence along the subsequent path of play. To do this suppose not and
consider two relevant cases.
Case 1: π − d∗ − κC > 0. Then VσC (g
1; d∗) = π−d
∗−κC
1−δ , and C can profitably deviate by choosing
d∗ = 0 and repressing in all future periods.
Case 2: π − d∗ − κC ≤ 0. If κC < π2 , then




which contradicts the upper bound described above. If κC < π − d̂(g1), then we have











which contradicts the upper bound described above. 
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The next example illustrates that the Center decentralizes in equilibrium (d∗, σ) and the sub-
sequent interaction entails gambling for unity.
Example 2 For the exogenous parameters, we consider π = 100, ψ = 100, κC = 40, κP = 95 and
δ = 0.9. In addition, F takes the form:
F(g) =

0 if g = 0
1
10 if g ∈ {1, . . . , 100}
3
10 if g = 101
1 if g ≥ 102.
and initial grievances are g1 = 101.
Note that κC < π2 , so Proposition 6.1 implies that if C decentralizes in an equilibrium (d
∗, σ),
then it chooses to neither repress nor grant independence in all future periods, in which case, C’s




− κP = 0
for some g′ > g−[0] and g′ ≤ g1. In words, if C decentralizes, it will choose a decentralization level
that makes the Periphery (at some grievance level g1) indifferent between mobilizing and not along
the subsequent path of play. If not, C can profitably deviate by offering slightly less decentralization
without changing the Periphery’s strategy in states g ≤ g1.
Given this discussion and the construction of F, there are three possible decentralization levels
to consider: {0, d̂(1), d̂(101)}. Note that d̂(101) = 2053 > κC. As such, the upper bound in the previous
proof shows that d∗ , d̂(101) in any equilibrium. Thus, there are only two possible decentralization
levels in equilibrium: {0, d̂(1)}.
If C chooses d∗ = 0, then g−[0] = 0 and g+[0] = 6. Because g1 > g+[0], if C chooses
d∗ = 0, then long-term repression is the equilibrium outcome, which implies C’s dynamic payoff is
π−κC
1−δ = 600.
If C chooses d∗ = d̂(1) = 5, then g−[d∗] = 100 and g+[0] = 102. Because g1 < g+[d∗], if C
chooses d∗ = d̂(1), then one period of gambling for unity is the equlibrium path of play, in which
case C’s expected utility is
−F(g1)ψ + (1 − F(g1))
[
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As such, C chooses to decentralize, d∗ = d̂(1) > 0 and gambling for unity occurs along the subse-
quent equilibrium path of play.
The next example illustrates that the Center decentralizes in equilibrium (d∗, σ) and the a
long-term peace emerges in the subsequent interaction.
Example 3 The payoff parameters match those from Example 2, but now F takes the form:
F(g) =

0 if g = 0
1
10 if g ∈ {1, . . . , 101}
1 if g ≥ 102.
and initial grievances are g1 = 101. Following the logic in the previous example, there are two
potential levels of decentralization in equilibrium: {0, d̂(1)}. If C chooses d∗ = 0, then its payoff
is π−κC1−δ = 600 for reasons described above. If C choses d
∗ = d̂(1), then g−[d∗] = 101 = g1 and
its equilibrium payoff is π−d
∗
1−δ = 950. As such, C chooses to decentralizes and a long-term peace
emerges.
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A Continuation Values and Expected Utilities
Let V̄i denote i’s continuation value after a history in which the Periphery was won control of the
territory. These values are independent of a strategy profileσ and take the form V̄C = 0 and V̄P =
πPP
1−δ .
Let Vσi (g) denotes i’s continuation value from beginning the game with grievance g when the
Periphery has not won control of its territory and actors subsequently playing according to profile
σ. In a similar vein, UσC (r; g) and U
σ
P (m; g) denote the Center and Periphery’s dynamic payoffs from
choosing r ∈ {∅, 0, 1} and m ∈ {0, 1} given grievance g when actors subsequently play according to
profile σ. For the Center, UσC (r; g) takes the following form:
UσC (r; g) =

0 if = ∅
πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1) if r = 1




C (max{g − 1, 0})
)
if r = 0.
1
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For the Periphery, UσP (m; g) denotes the its dynamic payoff conditional on having reached its deci-
sion node, i.e., the Center chooses r = 0, in state g. Thus, UσP (m; g) takes the form
UσP (m; g) =




P (max{g − 1, 0})
)
if m = 1
πCP + δV
σ
P (max{g − 1, 0}) if m = 0.
(5)
With this notation in hand, the next definition states the equilibrium conditions.
Definition 1 Strategy profile σ is an equilibrium if the following hold:




σP(g) > 0 =⇒ UσP (1; g) ≥ U
σ
P (0; g), and
σP(g) < 1 =⇒ UσP (0; g) ≥ U
σ
P (1; g)
for all grievance g and polices r, r′ ∈ {∅, 0, 1}.
Because the game is a dynamic game with a countable state space and a finite number of
actions, an equilibrium from Definition 1 exists in mixed strategies. Notice that for some grievance




σ(r; g)UσC (r; g).
Thus, if σ is an equilibrium and σ(r; g) > 0 for some grievance g and action r ∈ {∅, 0, 1}, then
VσC (g) = U
σ
C (r; g) or else C has a deviation by playing some r
′ ∈ {∅, 0, 1}.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 If grievances are small, then the Periphery never mobilizes, the Center neither re-
presses nor grants independence, and grievances dissipate on the equilibrium path. That is, g ≤ g−
implies σP(g) = 0 and σC(0; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. The proof that g ≤ g− implies the Periphery does not mobilize with positive probability
is covered in the main text. We prove that g ≤ g− implies the Center does not repress or grant
independence with positive probability. To see this, suppose σC(r; g) > 0 for some g ≤ g−, r , 0,
and equilibrium σ. There are two cases.
2
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Case 1: r = 1, repression. Then, C’s expected utility is
UσC (1; g) = πC − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1)










1−δ is C’s continuation value if it takes action r = 0 in all future periods because grievances
will never increase and P will never mobilize with positive probability along the subsequent path of
play. Hence, taking action r = 0 in all future periods is a profitable deviation, a contradiction.
Case 2: r = ∅, independence. Then, C’s expected utility is




As in Case 1, this inequality implies taking action r = 0 in all future periods is a profitable deviation,
a contradiction. 
C Properties of ṼC
We first state and prove three Lemmas concerning properties of ṼC.
Lemma 1 1. ṼC(g) >
−F(g)ψ+(1−F(g))πCC
1−(1−F(g))δ for all g such that F(g) > 0.
2. ṼC(g − 1) > ṼC(g) for all g > g−.
3. If Assumption 1 holds, then limg→∞ ṼC(g) =
−pψ+(1−p)πCC
1−(1−p)δ .
Proof. To show (1), consider some g such that F(g) > 0 and F(g′) = 0 for all g′ < g. Such a g exists
because F(0) = 0 and limg→∞ F(g) = p > 0. In addition, F(g) < 1 because there exists at least one
g such that F(g) ∈ (0, 1) by assumption. Then we have






= (1 − (1 − F(g))δ)
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ




−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
,
3
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where the strict inequality follows because F(g) ∈ (0, 1)
For induction, consider some g such that F(g) > 0 and F(g − 1) > 0, which implies g − 1 > 0.
Suppose the inequality holds for all g′ < g such that F(g′) > 0. Then we have
ṼC(g) = −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))(πCC + δṼC(g − 1))
> −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))
(
πCC + δ
−F(g − 1)ψ + (1 − F(g − 1))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g − 1))δ
)
≥ −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))
(
πCC + δ
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
)
=
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
,
where the third line follows because the fraction −F(g)ψ+(1−F(g))π
C
C
1−(1−F(g))δ is decreasing in F(g).
To show (2), note that it must hold when g = g− + 1, because ψ > 0 and F(g) > 0 as g > g−.
Now consider some g > g− + 1. For induction, suppose ṼC(g′ − 1) > ṼC(g′) for all g′ such that
g− < g′ < g. Then
ṼC(g) = −F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))(πCC + δṼC(g − 1))
≤ −F(g − 1)ψ + (1 − F(g − 1))(πCC + δṼC(g − 1))
< −F(g − 1)ψ + (1 − F(g − 1))(πCC + δṼC(g − 2))
= ṼC(g − 1),
where the second line follows because
ṼC(g) >
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
≥ −ψ
and F(g) is increasing in g.


























(1 − F(gn))(πCC + δṼC(gn − 1))
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The next Lemma demonstrates that C’s gambling for unity utility, ṼC is a lower bound on its
equilibrium expected utility, VσC .
Lemma 2 For all grievances g, VσC (g) ≥ ṼC(g) in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. To see this, suppose not. That is, suppose there exist grievance g and equilibrium σ such that
VσC (g) < ṼC(g). Then by the construction of ṼC and Proposition 1, g > g
−, or else VσC (g) =
πCC
1−δ = ṼC.
Next consider a deviation for C, labeled σ′C, such that σ
′
C(0; g
′) = 1 for all g′ ≤ g. I now
demonstrate that Vσ
′
C (g) ≥ ṼC(g), where σ
′ = (σ′C, σP), which implies σ
′
C is a profitable deviation
because ṼC(g) > VσC (g) by supposition.
The proof is by induction. The inequality, Vσ
′
C (g
′) ≥ ṼC(g′), holds when g′ ≤ g− by the




























C (g) ≥ ṼC(g) as required. 
The final Lemma demonstrates that the cutpoint g+ exists if and only if Assumptions 1 and 2
hold.
Lemma 3 The cutpoint g+ solving Equation (3) exists if and only if the Periphery values indepen-
dence (Assumption 1) and secession is costly (Assumption 2).
Proof. For necessity, suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then Lemma 1 and Assumption 1 imply




−pψ + (1 − p)πCC
1 − (1 − p)δ
.
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Because ṼC(g) =
πCC
1−δ > 0 for all g ≤ g
− and ṼC(g) is strictly decreasing in g when g > g−, we require
−pψ + (1 − p)πCC








We now demonstrate that the inequality in Equation (6) holds when πCC > κC, the proof when
πCC < κC is identical. Suppose π
C
C − κC > 0. Then Equation (6) reduces to
−pψ + (1 − p)πCC





which is equivalent to
ψ >
(1 − δ)κC − p(πCC − δκC)
p(1 − δ)
.










(1 − δ)κC − p(πCC − δκC)
p(1 − δ)
.
Thus, the inequality in Equation (6) holds, and therefore g+ exists.




1−δ for all grievances







for all grievances g. Now suppose Assumption 1 holds but
not Assumption 2. Then Lemma 1 implies that, for all g
ṼC(g) ≥
−pψ + (1 − p)πCC









In this section, we state and prove two technical results that are essential to characterize equi-
libria in the remainder of the paper.
Lemma 4 If σC(1; g) > 0 and σC(0; g + 1) = 1 for some grievance g, then σP(g + 1) < 1 in every
equilibrium σ.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists a g such that σC(1; g) > 1, σC(0; g + 1) = 1 and σP(g + 1) = 1
in equilibrium σ. We can write VσC (g + 1) as
















πCC − κC + δV
σ




VσC (g + 1) =
(1 − F(g + 1))(π(1 + δ) − δκC) − F(g + 1)ψ
1 − (1 − F(g + 1))δ2
.
By Lemma 2, VσC (g + 1) ≥ ṼC(g + 1). By Lemma 1.1,
ṼC(g) >
(1 − F(g + 1))πCC − F(g + 1)ψ
1 − (1 − F(g + 1)δ)
.
Stringing these two inequalities together,
VσC (g + 1) >
(1 − F(g + 1))πCC − F(g + 1)ψ
1 − (1 − F(g + 1)δ)
.
Substituting the closed form solution for VσC (g + 1) into the inequality above and solving for κC
reveals that
κC <
F(g + 1)(πCC + ψ(1 − δ))
1 − (1 − F(g + 1))δ
.
To derive a contradiction, consider a deviation in which C plays r = 1 with probability 1 in all
future periods beginning at grievance g + 1. This is a profitable deviation if and only if




F(g + 1)(πCC + ψ(1 − δ))




1−(1−F(g+1))δ as shown above. Hence, C can profitably deviate by repressing in all
future periods. 
Lemma 5 Consider some g > g− and equilibrium σ. If (a) σC(0; g− 1) = 1 or σC(0; g) = 1 and (b)
σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ < g, then σP(g) = 1.
Proof. Suppose not. That is, consider some equilibrium σ and grievance g > g− such that
(a) σC(0; g − 1) = 1 or σC(0; g) = 1,
7
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(b) σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ < g, and
(c) σP(g) < 1.
Because σ is an equilibrium, we require UσP (0; g) ≥ U
σ




V̄P − πCP − δV
σ
P (g − 1)
]
.
Because σC(0; g− 1) = 1 or σC(0; g) = 1, the path of play will never reach a grievance larger than g.
Because σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ ≤ g, the Center will never grant independence along the subsequent
path of play. Recall that when the C represses, P stage payoff is πCP , which is its payoff if it chooses
not to mobilize, and even if C does repress with positive probability at some g′ < g, the subsequent
path of play will still never reach a grievance larger than g. Then g > g− implies VσP (g−1) is bounded
above by
F(g)V̄P + (1 − F(g))πCP − κP
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
,
which is P’s payoff if its grievance never depreciates along the path of play, C never represses, and
P always mobilizes. Combining these two inequalities, we require
κP ≥ F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δV
σ




V̄P − πCP − δ
F(g)V̄P + (1 − F(g))πCP − κP
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
]
.







that is, g ≤ g−. But this contradicts the assumption g > g−. 
E Proof of Proposition 2
This section characterizes equilibrium behavior at moderate grievances.
We now prove that g < g+ implies σC(0; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ, that is, the Center
neither represses nor grants independence with moderate grievances. The result requires preliminary





for all g, and
we can set g+ = ∞ in the subsequent results.
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Lemma 6 If g < g+, then σC(∅; g) = 0 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. If not, then VσC (g) = U
σ
C (∅; g) = 0. If g < g
+, this contradicts Lemma 2 because ṼC(g) > 0 =
VσC (g). 
Lemma 7 For all g, σ(r; g) > 0 imply σ(∅; g + 1) = 0 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. First, if κC < πCC, then C cannot grant independence with positive probability in any equi-




1−δ > 0. Thus, consider the case where π
C
C − κC < 0. Suppose σC(r; g) > 0 for some g
and σC(∅; g + 1) > 0. Then
VσC (g) = U
σ
C (r; g)
= πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1)
= πCC − κC + δU
σ
C (∅; g)
= πCC − κC < 0,
but this means C can profitably deviate at g by granting independence, i.e., σ is not an equilibrium.

Lemma 8 Fix an equilibrium σ. Then there does not exist a g < g+ such that σC(1; g′) > 0 for all
g′ ≥ g.
Proof. Suppose not and consider such a g < g+ where σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ ≥ g in equilibrium σ.
Then
VσC (g) = U
σ
C (1; g) = π
C
C − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1).
Because VC(g′) = UσC (r; g
′) for all g′ such that σC(r; g′) > 0, similar substitutions imply VσC (g) =
πCC−κC






by Equation(3). However, ṼC(g) > VσC (g) contradicts Lemma 2. 
With these lemmas in hand, we now state the main result of the section.
Proposition 2 If grievances are moderate, then the Periphery always mobilizes, the Center neither
represses nor grants independence, and grievances dissipate on the equilibrium path. That is, g ∈
(g−, g+) implies σP(g) = 1 and σC(0; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
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Proof. We first prove prove that σC(0; g) = 1 when g ∈ (g−, g+) and σ is an equilibrium. Suppose
not. By Lemma 6, σC(1; g) > 0. Furthermore, C represses with positive probability for at most some
finite k periods by Lemma 8. That is, there exists a ḡ such that σC(1; g′) > 0 for g′ = g, ..., ḡ and
σC(1; ḡ + 1) = 0. By Lemma 7, this implies σC(0; ḡ + 1) = 1. In addition, Proposition 1 and Lemma
7 imply σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ < ḡ. Thus, Lemma 5 and σC(1; ḡ + 1) = 0 imply P mobilizes at ḡ + 1
with probability 1. However, σC(1; ḡ) > 0, σC(0; ḡ + 1) = 1, and σP(ḡ + 1) = 1 contradict Lemma
4. To pin down P’s strategy at g ∈ (g−, g+), note that σC(0; g′) = 1 for all g′ < g+. Then Lemma 5
implies σP(g) = 1. 
F Proof of Proposition 3
We now characterize equilibrium behavior at large grievances (g ≥ g+). We consider the











, where the inequality from Equation (3) holds strictly. If this held with equality, the
Center would be indifferent leading to trivial indeterminacy. We consider high- and low-capacity
regimes separately because the proof techniques vary dramatically between the two cases.
F.1 High repression capacity: κC < πCC
Lemma 9 In high-capacity regimes, σC(∅; g) = 0 for every grievance g and in every equilibrium
σ.
The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma 10 In high-capacity regimes, σC(1; g+) = 1 and σC(1; g) > 0 for all g > g+ in every
equilibrium σ.
Proof. The proof is by induction. First, we demonstrate that σC(1; g+) = 1. To see this, suppose
σC(1; g+) < 1. Then Lemma 9 implies σC(0; g+) > 0, in which case we have
UσC (0; g




This means C can profitably deviate at grievance g+ by repressing for an infinite number of periods,
a contradiction.
For induction, consider some g > g+ and assume σC(1; g − 1) > 0. To derive a contradiction,
assume σC(1; g) = 0. By Lemma 9, σC(0; g) = 1. Likewise, Lemma 9 guarantees C does not grant
10
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independence in any equilibrium, so Lemma 5 implies P mobilizes at g with probability 1. But then
this contradicts Lemma 4. 
Lemma 11 In high-capacity regimes, g ≥ g+ implies VσC (g) =
πCC−κC
1−δ in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. If g ≥ g+, then Lemma 10 implies σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ ≥ g. The remainder of the proof
follows from an identical argument as the one in Lemma 8. 
Lemma 12 In high-capacity regimes, g > g+ and σC(0; g) > 0 imply σP(g) < 1 in every equilibrium
σ.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists g > g+ such that σC(0; g) > 0 and σP(g) = 1. Because g > g+,




UσC (0; g) = U
σ




C (g − 1)) = π − κC + δV
σ
C (g + 1)










F(g)(πCC + (1 − δ)ψ)
1(1 − F(g))δ
,
where we use Lemma 11 and g − 1 ≥ g+ to substitute for values VσC (g − 1) and V
σ
C (g + 1).
Because σ is an equilibrium, we require UσC (1; g) = V
σ
C (g) ≥ ṼC(g), by Lemma 2. Then
Lemma 1.1 implies
UσC (1; g) >
−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC





−F(g)ψ + (1 − F(g))πCC
1 − (1 − F(g))δ
⇐⇒ κC <
F(g)(πCC + (1 − δ)ψ)
1(1 − F(g))δ
,
which establishes the desired contradiction. 
Lemma 13 In high-capacity regimes, there exists cutpoint ḡ ∈ R such that if g > ḡ, then σP(g) = 1
and σC(1; g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. The proof is constructive. Define ḡ ∈ N0 to be a number that satisfies
g ≥ ḡ =⇒ κP < F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δ
pV̄P + (1 − p)πCP − κP
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Such a ḡ exists because F(g)
[










V̄P − πCP − δ
pV̄P + (1 − p)πCP















We first show that σP(g) = 1 for g ≥ ḡ. Suppose not; then there exists g ≥ ḡ such that
σP(g) < 1. To rule out profitable deviations, we require UσP (0; g) ≥ U
σ
P (1; g), which is equivalent to
κP ≥ F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δV
σ
P (g − 1)
]
.
Because the Center never grants independence in strong regimes, VσP (g − 1) is bounded above by
pV̄P+(1−p)πCP−κP
1−(1−p)δ , which is the Periphery’s dynamic payoff if it mobilizes in every period at maximum
capacity, p. Combining these two inequalities gives us
κP ≥ F(g)
[
V̄P − πCP − δV
σ




V̄P − πCP − δ
pV̄P + (1 − p)πCP − κP
1 − (1 − p)δ
]
,
but this implies g < ḡ, which is contradiction. Thus, σP(g) = 1. Then Lemma 10 and the contrapos-
itive of Lemma 12 imply σC(1; g) = 1, as required. 
Lemma 14 In high-capacity regimes, if g ≥ g+, then σP(g) = 1 in every equilibrium σ.
Proof. Suppose there exists g ≥ g+ such that σP(g) < 1. Lemma 13 implies that there exists
grievance g† ≥ g such that σP(g†) < 1 and σP(g′) = σC(1; g′) = 1 for all g′ > g†. To rule out
profitable deviations, we require UσP (0; g










Because P will never be able to mobilize at a larger grievance than g† along the path of play and C
never grants independence, VσC (g
† − 1) is bounded above by
F(g†)V̄P + (1 − F(g†))πCP − κP
1 − (1 − F(g†)δ)
.
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V̄P − πCP − δ
F(g†)V̄P + (1 − F(g†))πCP − κP








which implies g† ≤ g− ≤ g+, a contradiction. 
We now prove Proposition 3.1, which characterizes equilibria in regimes with large grievances
when πCC > κC.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. If g ≥ g+, then Lemma 14 implies σP(g) = 1. Because g > g+ implies
σP(g) = 1. Lemma 10 and the contrapositive of Lemma 12 imply σC(1; g) = 1, as required. 
F.2 Low repression capacity: κC > πCC
Lemma 15 Fix an equilibrium σ. In low-capacity regimes, the there does not exist grievance g such
that σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ ≥ g.
Proof. The result follows from the inequality πCC − κC < 0 and the argument proving Lemma 8. 
Lemma 16 In low-capacity regimes, σP(g+) = 1, σC(0; g+) = 0, and σC(∅; g+) > 0 in ever equilib-
rium σ.
Proof. First, P mobilizes at g+ by Lemma 5 and Proposition 2.
Second, σC(0; g+) = 0. If not, then with positive probability the Center chooses to enter
the path of play into moderate grievance levels. That is, VσC (g
+) = UσC (0; g
+) = ṼC(g+). But then
VσC (g
+) < 0 because the regime has low capacity, so C can profitably deviate by granting indepen-
dence at g+.
Third, σC(1; g+) < 1. To see this, suppose not, i.e., suppose σC(1; g+) = 1. By Lemma 15,
there exists g† ≥ g+ such that σC(1; g† + 1) = 0 and σC(1; g†) > 0 for all g′ = g+, ..., g†. Then
by Lemma 7, σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ = g+, .., g† + 1. By Proposition 2, σC(0; g′) = 1 for all
g′ < g+. Then Lemma 5 implies σP(g† + 1) = 1. However, σC(1; g†) > 0, σC(0; g† + 1) = 1, and
σP(g† + 1) = 1 contradict Lemma 4. Thus, σC(1; g+) < 1, which implies σC(∅; g+) > 0 by the
previous paragraph. 
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Before proving the last technical lemma of this section, consider the following definitions. The
set G ⊆ N0 is an absorbing set with respect to profile σ if once the path of play enters grievance level
g such that g ∈ G, it never transitions to a grievance g′ such that g′ < G with positive probability.
The set G is an irreducible absorbing set with respect to σ if G is an absorbing set with respect to σ
and there does not exist a proper subset G′ ( G such that G′ is an absorbing set with respect to σ.
Lemma 17 Consider an equilibrium σ and some grievance g ≥ g+. Then the following hold:
1. beginning at grievance g, the path of play enters an irreducible absorbing set G with respect
to σ,
2. maxG exists,
3. g+ ≤ minG, and
4. there exists g′ ∈ G such that σC(∅; g) > 0.
Proof. To prove (1), consider g ≥ g+ and two cases. If σC(1; g) = 0, then the path of play enters the
set {g+, ..., g}, which is an absorbing set because σC(0; g+) = 0 by Lemma 16. So the set {g+, ..., g}
has a irreducible absorbing set, G. If σC(1; g) > 0, then Lemma 15 implies there exists g† ≥ g such
that σC(1; g′) > 0 for all g′ = g, ..., g† and σC(1; g† + 1) = 0 from Lemma 7. Then the path of play
enters the set {g+, ..., g† + 1}, which is an absorbing set as well.
The proof of (2) and (3) follow immediately from the existence of G and Lemmas 15 and 16,
respectively.
To prove (4), suppose not. Suppose σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ ∈ G. I first claim that it must be
the case that #G > 1. Suppose the contrary. Then G = {g′}, and C cannot be repressing with positive
probability at g, or else G is not absorbing. Also, if G = {g′} and σC(0; g′) > 0, then F(g) = 1 and
σP(g) = 1 or else the path of play would transition to g − 1 with positive probability. In this case,
UC(0; g′) = −ψ < 0, but this means C has a profitable deviation by granting independence at g′.
Thus, #G > 2 and as such maxG − 1 ∈ G.
Second, becauseG is irreducible, σC(1; maxG−1) > 0, or elseG\{maxG}would be absorbing
as well. Furthermore, σC(1; maxG) = 0 or else the path of play would transition with positive
probability to maxG + 1. Because σC(1; maxG − 1) > 0 and σC(1; maxG) = 0, Lemma 7 implies
σC(0; maxG) = 1 Because the path of play never leaves G nor transitions to grievance g′ > maxG
and C never grants independence along the path of play starting from maxG, then σP(maxG) = 1,
which follows from an identical argument as the one in Lemma 5. However, this contradicts Lemma
4. 
The proof of Proposition 3.2 follows from Lemma 17.
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G Proof of Proposition 4
First, the result in Proposition 4.1 follows immediately form Lemma 15. Second, the result
in Proposition 4.2 is proved below in Lemma 18. Third, I construct an equilibrium that supports
cycles of repression and mobilization, as described in Proposition 4.3, in Example 1. As part of this
construction, I need a new result in Lemma 19.
Lemma 18 If κC > (1+δ)πCC, then the Center never represses in any equilibrium σ, i.e., σC(1; g) = 0
for every grievances g and every equilibrium σ.
Proof. To derive a contradiction, suppose the contrary. That is, suppose κC > (1+δ)πCC and the Center
represses in equilibrium σ. Thus, the regime is has low capacity, and there exist some g such that
σC(1; g) > 0. By Lemma 15, there exists g† ≥ g such that σC(1; g† + 1) = 0 and σC(1; g′) > 0 for all
g′ = g, ..., g†. Then by Lemma 7, σC(∅; g′) = 0 for all g′ = g + 1, .., g† + 1. Hence, σC(0; g† + 1) = 1.
We can compute C’s continuation value at g† as
VσC (g
†) = σC(1; g†)UσC (1; g
†) + σC(0; g†)UσC (0; g
†) = UσC (1; g
†)



























πCC(1 + (1 − F(g
† + 1)σP(g† + 1))δ) − κC − F(g† + 1)σP(g† + 1)δψ
1 − (1 − σP(g† + 1)F(g† + 1))δ2
,
which is decreasing in σP(g† + 1). Because σP(g† + 1) ≥ 0, then
VσC (g
†) ≤
πCC(1 + δ) − κC
1 − δ2
Thus, κC > (1 + δ)πCC implies V
σ
C (g
†) < 0. But this implies C can profitably deviate at g† by granting
independence and guaranteeing itself a payoff of zero. 
Lemma 19 In low-capacity regimes, if F(g)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP and g ≥ g
+, then σP(g′) = 1 and
σC(1; g′) = 0 for all g′ ≥ g in every equilibrium σ.
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Proof. By Equation (1), P mobilizes at g′ if
κC < F(g′)
[






An upper bound on VσP (g
′ − 1) is π
P
P
1−δ , which is the discounted sum of P’s largest per-period payoff.
Combining these two inequalities implies P mobilizes when F(g′)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP, which holds
because F(g)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP, and F is increasing.
Second, I claim that σC(1; g′) = 0 for all g′ ≥ g. Suppose not. Then there exists a g† such that
σC(1; g†) > 0 and σC(0; g†+ 1) = 1 by Lemmas 7 and 15. The previous paragraph demonstrates that
P mobilizes with probability 1 with grievance g† + 1. But this contradicts Lemma 4. 
Example 1 In this example, I assume πCC = π
P
P = 1, and π
C
P = 0. In addition, κC = 1.2 and κP = .25.








175 if g ≥ 1 and g ≤ 8
1 otherwise.
Thus, g− = 0, and g+ = 7, because ṼC(6) ≈ .33 and ṼC(7) ≈ −.15. By Proposition 2, the Periphery
mobilizes with probability one for all g ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7} and the Center neither represses nor grants
independence for all g ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 6}. Note that F(9)(πPP − π
C
P) > κP, so Lemma 19 implies the
Periphery mobilizes for all grievances g ≥ 9 and the Center does not repress at grievance g ≥ 9.
We specify remaining behavior as follows.
1. At grievance g = 7, the Periphery mobilizes with probability 1 and the Center mixes between
repression and granting independence, σC(1; 7) + σC(∅; 7) = 1
2. At grievance g = 8, the Center neither represses nor grants independence, i.e., σC(0; 8) = 1
and the Periphery mobilizes with probability σP(8).
We first characterize mixing probabilities, σC(1; 7), σC(∅; 7), and σP(8), such that the following
hold:
σC(1; 7) + σC(∅; 7) = 1
UσC (1; 7) = U
σ
C (∅; 7)
UσP (1; 8) = U
σ
P (0; 8).
The first equation says the Center mixes between repression and granting independence at g = 7 =
g+. The second and third equations are C and P’s indifference conditions, respectively. Because
16
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UσC (∅; 7) = 0, C’s indifference equations takes the form:
πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (8) = 0, (7)
where
VσC (8) = σP(8)
[













In equilibrium, VσC (7) = U
σ
C (∅; 7) = 0. Thus, we have
VσC (8) = σP(8)
[
−F(8)ψ + (1 − F(8))πCC
]
+ (1 − σP(8))πCC.
Substituting the above equality into Equation (7), C’s indifference condition takes the form:




−F(8)ψ + (1 − F(8))πCC
]
+ (1 − σP(8))πCC
)
= 0. (8)
Next, consider P’s indifference equation, UσP (1; 8) = U
σ











































Here the second equality follows because σC(0; 8) = 1. Solving Equations (8) and (9) with the
constraint σC(∅; 7) + σC(1; 7) = 1 reveals that
σP(8) =





κP − F(8)(πPP − π
C
P)




Finally, we check profitable deviations. First, P’s indifference condition precludes profitable
deviations at g = 8. Second, C does not have a profitable deviation at g = 7 due to its indifference
17
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equation and because UσC (0; 7) = ṼC(7) < 0. Also, C has no profitable deviation at g = 8, because
VC(8) > 0. To see this, note that UσC (1; 7) = π
C
C − κC + δV
σ
C (8) = 0 by Equation (7), and π
C
C − κC < 0.
If C deviates by granting independence at g = 8, then its payoff is zero. Likewise, if C deviates
by repressing, its payoff is πCC − κC + δV
σ
C (9), which reduces to π
C
C − κC < 0 because C is granting
independence when g = 9. Lemma 19 implies that C cannot profitably deviate by using repression, at
grievances g ≥ 9. Thus, we only need to verify that C cannot profitably deviate by choosing to refrain
from repression or granting independence, at grievances g ≥ 9. Because the Periphery mobilizes at
g ≥ 9 and F(g) = 1, mobilization surely succeeds, implying UσC (0; g) = −ψ for all g ≥ 9 which is
strictly less than C’s utility from following its equilibrium strategy of granting independence.
H Exogenous Decentralization
In this section, I continue to analyze the numerical example in Figure 4 and prove Proposition
5.
From, the example in Figure 4, I compute the probability that the country breaks apart due to
secessionist mobilization —labeled probability of secession hereafter—as a function of decentral-
ization. For a fixed d, three potential paths of play emerge at initial grievance g1 in equilibrium. First,




g′:g†[d]<g′≤g1 (1 − F(g′)) otherwise.
Second, if g1 ≥ g+[d] and the regime has high capacity (π − d > κC), then the Center represses in
all future periods, and the probability of secession is zero. Third, if g1 ≥ g+[d] and the regime has
low capacity (π − d < κC), the probability of secession is undefined. Although the Periphery will
eventually gain control of its territory (Proposition 3.2), this may arise either from secessionist mo-
bilization or Center-granted independence. This third case does not arise in the numerical example.
As seen in Figure 4, if g1 ≥ g+[d] for some d, then the regime has high capacity.
Figure 6 graphs the probability of secession decentralization varies. When d is small, g1 >
g+[d] so the high-capacity regime represses and the probability of secession is zero. When d is
large, g1 < g−, so grievances are small and a lasting peace emerges. When d is moderate, then
the Center gambles for unity and secession occurs with positive probability. When ψ is large (left
panel), all decentralization levels below d = 44 result in long-term repression and a zero probability
of secession. When ψ is small (right panel), all decentralization levels below d = 38 result in
long-term repression and a zero probability of secession.
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Figure 6: Decentralization and comparative statics
Large     Small     




















Notes: The panels graph the probability of secession (vertical axis) for a fixed decentrlaization level (horizontal axis)
with a large cost of secession ψ = 3π2 (left) and a small cost ψ =
π
2 (right). The remaining parameters take on the
following valules: π = 100, κC = 50, κP = 50, δ = 0.95, and and F(g) = 1 −
(
0.01g + 0.001g2 − 1
)−1
.
Proposition 5 Assume the regime has a high capacity for repression (κC < π) and initial grievances
are large (g1 ≥ g+[0]). There exist cutpoints d and d such that 0 ≤ d < d < 1 and secession occurs
with positive probability on the equilibrium path only if decentralization is moderate, i.e., d < d < d.
Proof. Set d = 0. The regime has high repression capacity by assumption, and g1 ≥ g+[d] implies
that C represses with probability one in all future periods when the game begins at grievance g1. As
such the probability of secession is zero.
In addition, we can set d̄ as follows
d̄ = d̂(g1) + ε
where d̂ is defined in Equation (4) above and ε ∈ R is such that 0 < ε < max{ (1−δ)κPF(g1) , 1}. Note that
the fraction (1−δ)κPF(g1) is well defined because F(g
1) , 0. If F(g1) = 0 then g1 ≤ g−[0] < g+[0], a
contradiction.




because this inequality implies that g1 is small at decen-
tralization level d̄ and g− is strictly increasing in d. As such, g1 is small at decentralization levels
d > d̄. In addition, when g1 ≤ g− no mobilization occurs along the path of play by Proposition 1.
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When πCP = d and π
P





∣∣∣∣∣ κP > F(g)π − d1 − δ
}
.




, as required. 
I Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove Proposition 6.1 and then present two numerical examples that establish Propo-
sitions 6.2 and 6.3.
Proof of 6.1. Consider equilibrium (d∗, σ). We first prove that d∗ ≤ min{d̂(g1), κC}. First, d∗ ≤ κC.
To see this, note that VσC (g; d
∗) ≤ π−d
∗
1−δ . Thus, if C chooses d
∗ > κC, then VσC (g; d
∗) < π−κC1−δ , which
means C can profitably deviate by choosing d∗ = 0 and repressing in all future periods.
Second, d∗ ≤ d̂(g1). When C chooses d∗ > d̂(g1), then g1 ≤ g−[d∗], which implies that
VσC (g
1; d∗) = π−d
∗
1−δ , which is strictly decreasing in d
∗. So C has a profitable deviation by choosing
decentralization d = d∗ − ε for ε > 0 but close to zero. This establishes the desired result.
Finally, we prove that if κC < max
{
π
2 , π − d̂(g
1)
}
and d∗ > 0, then g1 < g+[d∗], i.e., C never
represses nor grants independence along the subsequent path of play. To do this suppose not and
consider two relevant cases.
Case 1: π − d∗ − κC > 0. Then VσC (g
1; d∗) = π−d
∗−κC
1−δ , and C can profitably deviate by choosing
d∗ = 0 and repressing in all future periods.
Case 2: π − d∗ − κC ≤ 0. If κC < π2 , then




which contradicts the upper bound described above. If κC < π − d̂(g1), then we have











which contradicts the upper bound described above. 
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The next example illustrates that the Center decentralizes in equilibrium (d∗, σ) and the sub-
sequent interaction entails gambling for unity.
Example 2 For the exogenous parameters, we consider π = 100, ψ = 100, κC = 40, κP = 95 and
δ = 0.9. In addition, F takes the form:
F(g) =

0 if g = 0
1
10 if g ∈ {1, . . . , 100}
3
10 if g = 101
1 if g ≥ 102.
and initial grievances are g1 = 101.
Note that κC < π2 , so Proposition 6.1 implies that if C decentralizes in an equilibrium (d
∗, σ),
then it chooses to neither repress nor grant independence in all future periods, in which case, C’s




− κP = 0
for some g′ > g−[0] and g′ ≤ g1. In words, if C decentralizes, it will choose a decentralization level
that makes the Periphery (at some grievance level g1) indifferent between mobilizing and not along
the subsequent path of play. If not, C can profitably deviate by offering slightly less decentralization
without changing the Periphery’s strategy in states g ≤ g1.
Given this discussion and the construction of F, there are three possible decentralization levels
to consider: {0, d̂(1), d̂(101)}. Note that d̂(101) = 2053 > κC. As such, the upper bound in the previous
proof shows that d∗ , d̂(101) in any equilibrium. Thus, there are only two possible decentralization
levels in equilibrium: {0, d̂(1)}.
If C chooses d∗ = 0, then g−[0] = 0 and g+[0] = 6. Because g1 > g+[0], if C chooses
d∗ = 0, then long-term repression is the equilibrium outcome, which implies C’s dynamic payoff is
π−κC
1−δ = 600.
If C chooses d∗ = d̂(1) = 5, then g−[d∗] = 100 and g+[0] = 102. Because g1 < g+[d∗], if C
chooses d∗ = d̂(1), then one period of gambling for unity is the equlibrium path of play, in which
case C’s expected utility is
−F(g1)ψ + (1 − F(g1))
[
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As such, C chooses to decentralize, d∗ = d̂(1) > 0 and gambling for unity occurs along the subse-
quent equilibrium path of play.
The next example illustrates that the Center decentralizes in equilibrium (d∗, σ) and the a
long-term peace emerges in the subsequent interaction.
Example 3 The payoff parameters match those from Example 2, but now F takes the form:
F(g) =

0 if g = 0
1
10 if g ∈ {1, . . . , 101}
1 if g ≥ 102.
and initial grievances are g1 = 101. Following the logic in the previous example, there are two
potential levels of decentralization in equilibrium: {0, d̂(1)}. If C chooses d∗ = 0, then its payoff
is π−κC1−δ = 600 for reasons described above. If C choses d
∗ = d̂(1), then g−[d∗] = 101 = g1 and
its equilibrium payoff is π−d
∗
1−δ = 950. As such, C chooses to decentralizes and a long-term peace
emerges.
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